The North Dakota Marketable Record Title Act by Ruemmele, Henry G.
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 41 Number 4 Article 3 
1964 
The North Dakota Marketable Record Title Act 
Henry G. Ruemmele 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ruemmele, Henry G. (1964) "The North Dakota Marketable Record Title Act," North Dakota Law Review: 
Vol. 41 : No. 4 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol41/iss4/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
THE NORTH DAKOTA MARKETABLE
RECORD TITLE ACT
HENRY G. RUEMMELE*
"No other remedial legislation which has been enacted or
proposed in recent years for the improvement of conveyancing offers
as much as the marketable title act. It may be regarded as the
keystone in the arch which constitutes the structure of a modernized
system of conveyancing."'
The need for a modernization of the conveyancing system in
the United States has been urged upon the organized bar for years.
Professor Paul E. Basye has commented:
For over half a century there has been ever increasing
dissatisfaction with our system of transferring land. On a
mounting scale real estate transactions have grown unneces-
sarily slow, unduly expensive, and needlessly uncertain.
With the passage of years and the lengthening of chains of
title, the process of appraising marketability has become
progressively more cumbersome. The machinery employed
for these purposes has become altogether inadequate for the
needs of our time.2
And over twenty-five years ago George E. Beers, then chairman
of the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of the
American Bar Association stated:
One of the discredits of our whole system has to do with
the recording of titles. It presents a topic of great difficulty.
Like Mark Twain's weather, everybody finds fault, but nobody
seems to be able to do anything about it. . . . [I]t is quite
true that the evil that men do lives after them, and is not
interred with their bones.3
The Committee on Acceptable Titles to Real Property, of the
same section, in its 1954 report noted:
This committee commented last year upon the increasing
dissatisfaction with our present general system of land
transfers, the confusion, frustration and irritation caused the
bar and the public thereby, and the threat contained therein
to the retention by the bar of its title practice ..... Thus a
* Lecturer in law University of North Dakota. Associate, Grand Forks Abstracting
Co. Ph.B., LL.B., North Dakota.
1. SIMES & TAYLOR, IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION 3 (1960).
2. SIMEs & TAYLOR, supra note 1, at xi.
3. Beers, What of the Future? The Work Before the Section of Real Property, Pro-
bate and Trust Law, A.B.A. SECTION OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST LAW 24
(1939).
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challenge is posed to the bar which it cannot afford to ignore.4
The 1964 report of the Committee on Improvement of Land
Records of the same section said simply, "this challenge remains
to be met."'5
Apparently the warning that the bar might not retain its title
practice did more to arouse the bar to these warnings than anything
else,6 as a complete study of the subject was undertaken with the
result that a joint project resulted not only in recommendations to
improve the system by legislation but by the use of title standards.,
The biggest problem confronting even those who were aware of
the dissatisfaction of the conveyancing system was what to do about
it. The tremendous building development following World War II,
coupled with the use of real property as a hedge against inflation
and increasing income taxes, brought about pressures on the system
that it was not able adequately to meet under existing laws and
practices of title examiners.
The foundation of the American conveyancing system has been
the recording acts. Recording statutes were originally designed to
prevent fraudulent conveyances and provide a public depository upon
which a purchaser could rely with some certainty. However, as
time goes the instruments of record become more numerous, original
indexing systems make it very tedious to find the instruments in
the chain being searched, and the number of errors in the instruments
and the record correspondingly increases. The first basic need in
improvement is to make the record a more reliable source for an
intelligent determination as to the actual state of the title, and the
second basic need is uniformity on the part of title examiners in
making that determination.
The first improvement must come by way of legislation, as the
record is a creature of statutory law. It has been suggested that
this legislation should endeavor to accomplish the five following
propositions:
(a) The record should include, as nearly as possible, all
the facts required to determine the state of the title....
(b) So far as practicable, the record should be self-
proving....
4. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON IMPROVEMENT OF LAND RECORDS, A.B.A. SECTION OF
REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST LAW 34 (1954).
5. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON IMPROVEMENT OF LAND RECORDS, A.B.A. SECTION OF
REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST LAW 94 (Aug. 10-12, 1964).
6. E.g. State Bar of Arizona v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d
1 (1961); State v. Dlnger, 14 Wis. 2d 193, 109 N.W.2d 685 (1961); New Jersey State
Bar Ass'n. v. Northern N.J. Mtg. Ass'n, 32 N.J. 430, 161 A.2d 257 (1960); Bar Ass'n.
of Tenn. Inc. v. Union Planters Title Guar. Co., 46 Tenn. App. 100, 326 S.W.2d 767
(1959); Beech Abstract & Guar. Co. v. Bar Ass'n. of Arkansas, 230 Ark. 494, 326 S.W.2d
900 (1959) ; Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. State Bar of Nevada, 74 Nev. 186, 326 P.2d
408 (1958) ; Title Guar. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 423, 312 P.2d 1011 (1957) ;
San Antonio Bar Ass'n. v. Guardian Abstract & Title Co., 156 Tex. 7, 291 S.W.2d 697
(1956) ; Cooperman v. West Coast Title Co., 75 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1954).
7. SIMES & TAYLOR, MODEL TITLE STANDARDS (1960).
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(c) The length of the record required for a marketable
title should be shortened ...
(d) Stale claims should be eliminated....
(e) Some future interests should be restricted in dura-
tion .... 11
The second improvement must come by way of uniformity in
appraisal of title. The adoption of title standards has done much,
but there is still a long way to go.9
These suggestions for improvement clearly recognize an inade-
quate record and a lack of uniformity in an examiner's conclusions.
From the recording system courts of equity established as a standard
for an acceptable title as a "good title," "a merchantable title," or
a "marketable title," and the examiner's purpose then became
that of determining whether the record disclosed, in his opinion,
such a title.
Generally the giving of a name to a title does not in and of itself
constitute much help to an examiner. The North Dakota Supreme
Court has stated:
A "good and merchantable title" means a title in fee simple,
free from litigation, palpable defects, and grave doubts; that
is, a title which will enable the purchaser not only to hold
the land in peace, but will enable him, whenever he may
desire to do so, to sell or mortgage the land to a person of
reasonable prudence and caution. 10
Such a definition really served no purpose when it used the term
"grave doubts" or "reasonable prudence and caution," as what met
the test of these terms soon becomes the standard established by
the most picayunish fly specker in the community. But even courts
have found it necessary to expand their thinking and the North
Dakota Supreme Court in 1955, relying on a New Mexico case, 1
added an additional requirement:
We are satisfied that at the time the title was rejected
the probability was very remote that Charles Breen would
assert any claim to the property. This record is devoid of
evidence that any attack by Charles Breen would have been
successful. The remote possibilities charged as defects
against this title are not sufficiently substantial to raise a
reasonable doubt as to its validity. The title was therefore
marketable.12
A comment on this holding that a defect does not create a
reasonable doubt unless there is something more than a probability
that the title would be successfully attacked stated:
8. SIMES & TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 1, at xvii.
9. See BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES § 7 (1953).
10. Kennedy v. Dennstadt, 31 N.D. 422, 154 N.W. 271 (1915).
11. Campbell v. Doherty, 53 N.M. 280, 206 P.2d 1145 (1949),
12. Coverston v. Egeland, 69 N.W.2d 790 (N.D. 1955).
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We suggest that the holding in Coverston v. Egeland, is a
dangerous expansion of the rule, for (1) it shifts to the
buyer the burden of showing that the title is unmarketable,
and (2) forces upon an unprotected purchaser the risk of
defending his title against a clear defect in what might
prove to be expensive litigation.'3
The bar cannot justify a system which demands the examination
of the record by members of the bar, who sometimes cannot agree,
and causes all parties concerned to resort to litigation in the final
analysis to judge the quality of a title. Title standards were designed
to remove areas of disagreement and adopt a standard as a guide
for all examiners. In a limited way these have been successful.
However, in 1945 Michigan adopted a most far reaching statute 14
which was designed to (1) define the marketability of the owner's
title in terms of his record title during a specified period of time
and (2) to bar and extinguish all claims and interests having an
origin prior to a certain date or period of time. The second purpose
of the statute had been used as early as 1919,15 but the first purpose
was distinctly unique in its approach, as for the first time a statutory
definition of the term "marketability of record" was available to
guide the examiners and the courts; thus the birth of the marketable
record title acts.
It was not long before other states followed this lead.' 6 A model
act was proposed in 1960," and following the pattern of the model
act other states enacted this type of legislation. 8
The North Dakota statute in defining marketability states:
Any person having the legal capacity to own real estate in
this state, who has an unbroken chain of title to any interest
in real estate by himself and his immediate or remote
grantors under a deed of conveyance which has been re-
corded for a period of twenty years or longer, and is in
possession of such real estate, shall be deemed to have a
marketable record title to such interest, subject only to
such claims thereto and defects of title as are not extinguished
or barred by the application of the provisions of this chapter,
instruments which have been recorded less than twenty years,
and any encumbrances of record not barred by the statute
of limitations.'9
and in definition it is said:
A person shall be deemed to have the unbroken chain of
13. REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON ACCEPTABLE TITLES TO REAL PROPERTY, A.B.A. SECTION OF
REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST LAW 32 (1955).
14. MICH. CoMp. LAWS §§ 565.101 to 565.109 (1948).
15. Iowa Acts 1919, ch. 270, § 1.
16. See, e.g., S.D. CODE, ch. 51.16B (1960); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-288 to 76-298(1958) ; N.D. CENT. CODE, ch. 47-19A (1960).
17. SIMES & TAYLOR, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 4.
18. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. ch. 712 (1963); Indiana Ann. Stat. ch. 56-11 (Supn.
1964); Okla. Stat Ann. tit. 16 §§ 71-81 (Supp. 1964); Utah Code Ann. ch. 57-9 (1963).
19. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19A-01 (1960).
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title to an interest in real estate when the official public
records of the county wherein such land is situated disclose
a conveyance or other title transaction dated and recorded
twenty years or more prior thereto, which conveyance or
other title transaction purports to create such interest in
such person or his immediate or remote grantors, with
nothing appearing of record purporting to divest such person
and his immediate or remote grantors of such purported
interest.2 0
and a
Title transaction means any transaction affecting title to
real estate, including title by will or descent from any person
who held title of record at the date of his death, title by a
decree or order of any court, title by tax deed or by trustee's,
referee's, guardian's, executor's, master's in chancery, or
sheriff's deed, as well as by direct conveyance. 21
There has been a good deal of discussion by law review writers
as to the length of the chain of title to be used to give the effect of
marketability. Most statutes provide a forty year period, and some
have stated the longer period is used to eliminate a rash of claims
being filed. However, the experience in North Dakota has not in-
dicated that the twenty year period brings forth any more filing
of claims than the forty year period would. A ten year period might
well be better.
In the practical application of the statute the examiner looks
for a "conveyance or other title transaction" of record twenty years
or longer, and uses this as the "root of title." By the terms of the
statute the claiming record owner can only claim such interest
which the conveyance or other title transaction "purports" to create
by this root of title, if nothing appears of record subsequent thereto
purporting to divest such person and his immediate or remote
grantors of such purported interest.
The Nebraska Supreme Court in applying this statutory require-
ment to a quit claim deed which quit claimed all the right, title,
interest estate, claim and demand, both ,at law and in equity, of a
grantor who was the owner as a tenant in common of only an
undivided one-tenth interest in the land held, "The weakness and
defect in the claim of appellees is that they assert an interest in
the land more extensive than that which the quit claim deed purported
to create in the grantee named in that deed."22 And thus the present
record claimant could only make claim under the act to the undivided
one-tenth interest.
An interesting question is raised as to what interpretation the
20. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19A-02(1) (1960).
21. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19A-02(2) (1960).
22. Smith v. Berberich, 168 Neb, 142, 95 N.W.2d 325, 329 (1959).
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North Dakota Supreme Court might place on a quit claim deed
under the marketable record title statute. The Court has held that
a quit claim deed is as effective as a warranty deed to confer
color of title,23 and is sufficient to create a color of title under the
ten-year color of title act,2 4 intimating that quite likely there is a
big difference in quit claiming all "that" right, title and interest,
and quit claiming all "his" right, title and interest.
A good deal of discussion has arisen relative to the county
auditor's tax deed issued to the county for the nonpayment of
taxes. 25 Some examiners take the position that such a deed is a
sufficient "root of title" notwithstanding the rights of the former
owner to repurchase.2 6 The better view would seem to be that the
county holds title subject to this right of repurchase, and that the
tax deed to the county purports to convey only such a title.
Statutory limitations on sales by representatives and other court-
appointed officers must also be considered.2 7  Some of the acts
apparently do not have a limitation upon the title gaining the benefit
from the provisions of the act. 28
In addition to the requirement of the unbroken chain of title
the statute requires that the record title claimant be "in possession
of such real estate" in order to be deemed to have a marketable
record title, and the "fact of possession of real estate referred to in
section 47-19A-01 may be shown of record by one or more affidavits
which shall contain the legal description of the real estate referred
to and show that the record titleholder is upon the date thereof in
possession of such real estate." 29 It is quite clear that the statute
anticipates that the record title claimant shall be in actual possession
of the premises, or that his possession shall be that imputed to the
title claimant where no one else is in the actual possession hostile
to the title claimant.
The fact of possession requirement in order to secure the benefits
of this type of legislation was conceived in 1919 in the original
Iowa Act.30 Some misunderstanding has developed over this re-
quirement, but the full import of the purpose adds clarification.
The basis for the requirement is more than likely the thought that
in order to override constitutional objections the claimant must be
23. Morrison v. Hawksett, 64 N.W.2d 786 (N.D. 1954).
24. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-06-03 (1960).
25. N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-28-09 (1960).
26. N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-28-19 (1960).
27. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-19-20 (1960) provides that a sale of property under that
chapter by an executor or administrator "conveys all of the right, title, interest, and
estate of the decedent in the premises at the time of his death" and also that which he
might have acquired by operation of law subsequent thereto. It would seem that in such
cases the title of decedent should be examined even though beyond the 20-year period.
28. See Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957), where the court
took the view that the act contemplated a fee simple. See also, United Parking Stations,
Inc. v. Calvary Temple, 257 Minn. 273, 101 N.W.2d 208 (1960).
29. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19A-07 (1960).
30. Iowa Acts 1919, ch. 270, § 1.
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in possession. This gains its theory from statements that limitation
statutes cannot constitutionally compel a resort to legal proceedings
by one who is already in the complete enjoyment of all he claims 3 '
or that a right cannot be cut off by compelling prosecution of a
remedy when he is already in possession of all that he demands. 2
It is argued by some that even this questionable constitutional
limitation can be very readily circumvented by looking upon the
marketable title acts not as placing a limit on the time to commence
an action but rather requiring a recording or re-recording to give
notice of existing interests, and can extinguish claims of those who
fail to record in time,33  but we find no case squarely in
point. 4
The North Dakota court has clearly found that it is not the
affidavit of possession, but the fact of possession which gives the
benefit of the act.3 5 However, there is a benefit to be derived
from the recording of an affidavit to establish of record the fact
of possession. It completes the record insofar as the statutory re-
quirement is concerned. If the affidavit is false the statutory
requirements have not been met, and no claims are barred or the
holder thereof precluded from enforcing them. But, insofar as the
record can, it does show a title which meets the test demanded in
most land sales contracts used in abstract-attorney's opinion systems
requiring an abstract of title showing a title marketable of record.
The problem of possession in reality only arises at the time
when the acceptability of the title is an issue in a discussion of a
method to simplify a system for land transfers. No real purpose is
gained in establishing a satisfactory title of record and forcing upon
a vendee a title which he can only enjoy by resorting to litigation to
gain the enjoyment of possession.
However, as a matter of substantive right to possession, we find
that under the North Dakota act that
Such marketable title shall be held by such person and shall
be taken by his successors in interest free and clear of all
interest, claims, any charges whatever, the existence of
which depends in whole or in part upon any act, transaction,
event, or omission that occurred twenty years or more prior
thereof, whether such claim or charge be evidenced by a
recorded instrument or otherwise, and all such interests,
31. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 365 (1st ed. 1868).
32. Groesbeck v. Seeley, 13 Mich. 329 (1865).
33. SIMES & TAYLOR, OP. cit. supra note 1, at 271.
34. Wichelman v. Messner, supra n. 28, at 828, has been cited for the constitutionality
of this approach, the court declaring, "[I]t appears further that the constitutionality of
the Minnesota statute is preserved by the provisions exempting persons in 'possession of
real estate' from the requirement of filing notice and allowing persons not in possession
a reasonable time to file statutory notice."
35. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Advance Realty Co., 78 N.W.2d 706 (N.D. 1956),
where the court held that the owner of the surface could claim no possession of severed
minerals, and not having possession by exercising some dominion or possession of the
minerals separate and apart from the surface estate, he could not claim the pr6tection
of the act
481
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claims, and charges affecting such interest in real estate
shall be barred and not enforceable at law or equity, unless
any person making such claim or asserting such interest or
charge, shall, on or before twenty years from the date of
recording of deed of conveyance under which title is claimed,
* . .file for record a notice in writing, duly verified by oath,
setting forth the nature of his claim, interest or charge;
and no disability nor lack of knowledge of any kind on the
part of anyone shall operate to extend the time for filing
such claims after the expiration of twenty years from the
recording of such deed of conveyance .... 6
The question of what effect this section-which purports to bar
all interests, claims and charges which depend upon any act, trans-
action, event or omission that occurred twenty years or more prior
to such marketable title-will have upon one claiming under adverse
possession still remains. It would seem that the actual entry by
the adverse possessor would constitute an "act" or an "event"
within the purview of the statute. Under a similar statute which
states claims arising prior to the statutory period "shall be con-
clusively presumed to have been abandoned," the Minnesota court
has ruled:
If a claimant subject to the provisions of the statute has
not filed the required notice, the only way he can avoid the
statute's conclusive presumption is by being in possession
at the time it would otherwise take effect. If at any later
time he abandons his possession, the bar falls and he cannot
revive his right by again going into possession. Thus, to
avoid the conclusive presumption of abandonment imposed
by the statute, the claimant's possession must be continu-
ous. 7
It would seem that under the twenty-year adverse possession statute
of North Dakota 8 an entry made prior to the "root of title" deed
could only ripen into title by a continuous possession for twenty
years after the recording of the root of title and up to the time
the acceptability of title is to be determined. Such adverse possession
would prevent the record title claimant from ever qualifying for the
protection afforded by the marketable record title act.
Upon the same reasoning it would seem that the entry by an
adverse possessor after the recording of the root of title instrument
is not within the purview of the statute at all.
The effect of marketable record title on the so-called "Ten Year
Color of Title Statute"3 9 constitutes in a sense a different question.
This statute presupposes an instrument creating a color of title
36. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19A-03 (1960).
37. B.W. & Leo Harris Co. v. City of Hastings, 240 Minn. 44, 59 N.W.2d 813, 816
(1953), where the court further stated the nature of the possession contemplated by the
statute was such as would put a prudent person on inquiry.
38. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-04 (1960).
39. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-06-03 (1960). Also see, Ruemmele, North Dakota's Ten-Year
Statute of Limitations, 28 N.D.L. REv. 159, 298 (1952).
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in the grantee, and an adverse possession and payment of taxes for
a period of ten years. The instrument need not necessarily be
placed of record. If the instrument is placed of record or the entry
made subsequent to the recording of the root of title, there would
seem to be no question of the applicability of the marketable record
title act. If the instrument is not placed of record, but the entry
made prior to the recording of the root of title, subsequent recording
of the color of title instrument should constitute a sufficient notice
under the act, and a continuous possession would prevent the act
from applying at all. If the color of title is recorded prior to the
recording of the root of title and the entry made either prior to such
recording or after and continues adversely for a period of ten years
or more, coupled with the payment of taxes, for the same period,
we could conceivably have a situation arise which could cause some
difficulty. For example, if the adverse possessor should remain in
possession for nineteen years after the recording of the root of title,
and then abandons his possession, the root of title claimant could
go into the actual possession and be there at the expiration of the
twenty-year period.
The North Dakota Court has stated in regard to the ten-year
statute:
The contention, in effect, that the statute. . .is merely a
statute of limitations, and may not be used as a sword of
attack, but only as a shield of defense, is without merit.
By the express language of this section, as well as the pre-
ceding one, a compliance therewith operates to confer a good
and valid title, and we know of no reason why a title thus
acquired cannot be asserted by its owner in exactly the
same manner as a title acquired in any other way.40
Perhaps in the hands of a bona fide purchaser from the root of title
claimant, the adverse possessor under the color of title would be
barred by the recording statutes, 41 but this area of uncertainty
should be considered for improvement along with the whole body
of limitation statutes dealing with real property.
With the usual skepticism found in a slow moving Bar, some
members of the North Dakota Bar had evidenced a reluctance to
rely upon the marketable record title act on constitutional grounds,
especially where it is stated to be applicable to those under a disability
or without knowledge. Simes & Taylor 2 make a very exhaustive
study of the problem and conclude the authority in favor of
constitutionality, especially the Minnesota case of Wichelman v.
Messner," ' is quite strong. Courts in many instances have found
40. Woolfolk v. Albrecht, 22 N.D. 36, 45, 133 N.W. 310, 314 (1911).
41. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19-41 (1960).
42. SiMEB & TAYLOR, IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION (1960).
43. 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957).
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the legislative purposes of simplifying and facilitating real estate
title transactions far outweigh the outmoded tethers of past decisions
dealing with constitutionality.
North Dakota has seen fit to adopt a type of marketable record
title act which defines what shall constitute such a title. It has been
said that "the title will be marketable because the act makes it so,
and not because the act declares it so.""44 If the act makes the title
marketable, why should not the act declare it does? One of the
problems of modern practice has been the indefiniteness of
"marketability," which most examiners have considered synonymous
with an acceptable title, or one which a purchaser or lender would
be obliged to accept. 45 One of the main purposes of marketable
record title acts is to narrow the distinction between "marketability
of record" and "marketability in fact," recognizing in a large sense
the "marketability of record" standard adopted by many land sales
contracts is not one which is acceptable in modern times.46 The
record must be bolstered to constitute much more than a bundle
of rebuttable presumptions and assumptions.
Quite often when endeavoring to secure the passage of legislation
it becomes necessary to compromise on certain points. Some of the
exceptions of the North Dakota act are grounded on this reason.
The exceptions state the chapter on marketable record title shall
not be
1. Applied to bar:
a. The rights of any lessor or his successor as
reversionary of his right to possession on the expira-
tion of any lease by reason of failure to file the
notice herein required;
b. The rights of any remainderman upon the expiration
of any life estate or trust created before the recording
of a deed of conveyance as set out in section
47-19A-01.
c. Rights founded upon any mortgage, trust deed, or
contract for sale of lands which is not barred by
the statute of limitations; or
d. A mere possibility not coupled with an interest nor
a mere right of re-entry or repossession for breach
of a condition subsequent created by a conveyance
of record less than forty years; or
2. Deemed to affect the right, title or interest of the state
44. SIMES & TAYLOR, Op. cit. supra note 42, at 305.
45. Ibid., where the authors say, "the acts do not dictate the title which a purchaser
or lender must accept or an examiner must approve. It might be possible to legislate in
that plane, but the acts do not do so .... "" But see 3 American Law of Property § 11.48,
n. 1 (Supp. 1962),where It is stated: "Statutory definitions of marketable title now de-
termine in several states the type of title which will be treated as marketable and to
which a purchaser cannot raise the objection of unmarketability." Marketable record title
acts of Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota and South Dakota are cited.
46. See BASYT, CLRIrNO LAND TrrLS §§ 4, 373 and 374 (1953).
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of North Dakota, or the United States, in any real estate
in North Dakota.
3. Applied to the right, title, or interest of any railroad. 47
Excepting the reversionary right of the lessor is generally an
exception in all the acts, and can be justified on the basis that the
possession of the tenant should be considered the possession of the
landlord. Also, the landlord would not be very likely to know of
hostile claims where the tenant is actually in possession.
The rights of remaindermen upon the expiration of any life
estate were excepted from the act primarily because of the Iowa
case of Lane v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn.48 as at the time
the act was considered there were some that felt the barring of the
rights of remaindermen was inserting an unduly harsh provision.
Removing mortgages, trust deeds, and contracts of sale from
the purview of the act was based upon the thought that separate
statutes should be applied to these. In 1959 a special statute applica-
ble to mortgages was passed endeavoring to define more clearly the
limitations upon actions to foreclose,4 9 but this enactment was re-
pealed5 effective January 1, 1964, and in lieu thereof some apparent
weaknesses were eliminated by new enactments effective January
1, 1964. 51
Also in 1959 special treatment was given to the cancellation or
enforcement of contract for sale of real estate.5 2 These enactments
are in reality statutes of limitations, which remove any possible
extension by partial payment, disability, or nonresidence, so that
the record itself can be self-executing in eliminating such recorded
instruments from the examiners consideration, and really are
complementary to the marketable record title act.
The problem of the elimination of stale reverters and rights of
re-entry was anticipated in the original enactment of the marketable
record title act in 1951, but because of the large number of reverters
and rights of re-entry in existence, the proponents of the act were
obliged to eliminate from the effect of the act "conditions sub-
sequent contained in any deed." While not apparently applying to
possibilities of reverter, the act did come in for criticism very
early.53 In 1959 the Legislature clarified this particular exception,
and added a limitation.54 Under North Dakota statutes property of
any kind may be transferred except: "1. A mere possibility not
47. N.D. CENT. CODE %§ 47-19A-11 (1960).
48. 230 Iowa 973, 299 N.W. 553 (1941). This case cut off contingent remainders of
minors.
49. N.D. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 256, § 1.
50. N.D. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 256, § 4.
51. HID. CENT. CODE §§ 35-03-14, 15 (Supp. 1963).
52. D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-42 (Supp. 1963).
53. See Leahy, The North Dakota Marketable Record Title Act, 29 N.D.L. Rzv. 265(1953).54. N.D. . CODE § 47-19A-11 (1960).
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coupled with an interest; and 2. A mere right of re-entry or of
repossession for breach of a condition subsequent which cannot be
transferred to anyone except the owner of the property affected
thereby." 55
The North Dakota Supreme Court has never had occasion to
consider just what types of interests are meant by the statute.
However, the South Dakota Court in construing a deed on the same
statutory provision found it contained a "reverter clause" with
"reverter language" and partakes of the nature of "a condition
subsequent."5 6 In the belief that in referring to a "mere possibility
not coupled with an interest" the statute meant to refer to a fee
simple upon a conditional limitation, and in referring to "a mere
right of re-entry or of possession for breach of a condition subsequent"
the statute meant to refer to a fee simple upon a condition subsequent,
the 1959 enactment borrowed this language and made the act subject
only to such interests "created by a conveyance of record less than
forty years," thus materially limiting the continuance of such possible
claims.
Perhaps no subject has been dealt with more prolifically than the
marketable title acts. Simes & Taylor have included a bibliography
listing those prior to 1960, and indices to current publications contain
many more. The consideration of the problem of simplified pro-
cedures for land transfers by so many gives an indication that the
Bar is aware of the apparent public dissatisfaction and the growing
use of other than the traditional systems. There is still much to be
done, especially as to the record itself.
65. N.D. CENT. CODS § 47-09-02 (1960).
56. Rowbotham v. Jackson, 68 S.D. 566, 5 N.W.2d 36 (1942). See Meschke, Estates
in North Dakota, 30 N.D.L. RNV. 289 (1954) ; Comment, 25 N.D. BAR BRIEFS 124 (1949).
